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Abstract 
The negativity bias challenges our understanding of how both citizens and managers respond 
to performance information. It posits that negative information has a stronger impact than 
positive information of the same magnitude. However, studies of bias in public 
administration have revealed mixed results. We conduct the first set of experiments with the 
sole purpose of estimating the negativity bias in citizens’ responses to performance 
information. Moreover, we extend the analysis beyond evaluations and outline a theory and 
test of how negative performance information also elicits stronger responsibility attributions 
among citizens: a search for the underlying causes for poor performance. We investigate the 
negativity bias with three experiments embedded in two large nationally-representative 
samples of citizens (n=1,559 and n=1,013). Within a conservative equivalence framing 
framework, we find very strong evidence of a large negativity bias. A direct replication 
confirms this conclusion. In addition, we find that citizens are much more likely to 
spontaneously engage in attributions about responsibility after being exposed to negative 
performance data. The findings have implications for our understanding of both citizens and 
managers responses to performance information and provides a strong empirical connection 
between negativity bias and blame avoidance. 
 
 
Keywords: negativity bias; responsibility attribution; performance information; survey 
experiments; blame avoidance 
 
 
Acknowledgment: 
Ideas expressed in the manuscript has benefited from helpful comments and suggestions from 
Oliver James, Sebastian Jilke, Martin Vinæs Larsen, and Gregg van Ryzin. Parts of the 
results were presented at a pre-conference on experimental public administration at the Public 
Management Research Conference (PMRC) June 11-13, 2015, Minneapolis, Minnesota. The 
author would like to thanks participants for helpful comments and suggestions. 
 
Funding: 
The research was funded by two grants: 1) Grant no. 0602-02577B from the Danish Council 
for Independent Research and 2) a grant from the Master of Public Governance (MPG) at the 
University of Copenhagen and Copenhagen Business School in Denmark. Project title: “The 
Psychology of the Public Sector”. 
 
  
 
2 
 
Introduction 
The negativity bias has recently gained considerable attention in the field of public 
administration, particularly regarding the study of attitudinal and behavioral responses to 
performance information (James and John 2007; Boyne et al. 2009; James 2011a; 2011b; 
James and Moseley 2015; Olsen 2015). The negativity bias posits a fundamental 
asymmetrical response to positive and negative information in which “negative events are 
more salient, potent, dominant in combinations, and generally efficacious than positive 
events” (Rozin and Royzman 2001, 297). The implications and importance of understanding 
a negativity bias go beyond the context of how citizens draw on performance information. 
Most notably, negativity bias is seen as the driving micro-foundation for blame avoidance 
among administrative and political leaders (Weaver 1986: 373; Marvel 2014; Moynihan 
2012; Hood 2007; 2010; Dixon and Hood 2010; Charbonneau and Bellavance 2012; Nielsen 
and Bækgaard 2015). In short, if the effect of negative and positive information is highly 
skewed towards the former, then performance information will systematically increase the 
assignment of blame while having little or no effect on the assignment of praise and credit for 
good performance. The down-stream effect in the political-administrative system is that 
managers and politicians will primarily follow a mini-max strategy and be more concerned 
with avoiding bad performances than with striving for excellence (Hood and Dixon 2010). 
However, while psychology finds consistent support for a negativity bias in human 
perception, emotional responses, decision making, behavior, and memory (Baumeister et al. 
2001; Rozin and Royzman 2001), the findings in public administration have been more 
mixed. James (2011b, 414) argues that, “More investigation of possible difference in 
magnitude of effect between information about good and bad performance is merited.” 
Furthermore, we have no direct evidence of how a negativity bias would affect citizens’ 
attribution of responsibility for the observed performance.   
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In this article, we conduct three experiments in two large and nationally-
representative samples (n=1,559 and n=1,013) which directly (a) address the question of a 
negativity bias in citizens responses to performance information and (b) provide the first test 
of how negative performance elicits responsibility attribution. For the study of the negativity 
bias in evaluations we draw on a modified equivalence framing experiment in which subjects 
are provided substantively equivalent descriptions of the performance level but with varying 
valence, i.e. negative, neutral, and positive (Levin, Schneider, and Gaeth 1998). It solves 
three fundamental problems of the current research: First, it allows us to compare the effect 
of “good” and “poor” performance that only differs in valence, but is qualitatively the same. 
Second, it provides a neutral level of performance which allows us to estimate the 
asymmetrical effect of positive and negative information relative to a neutral benchmark. 
Thirdly, it is a hard test of the negativity bias which implies that any confirming evidence 
will be more credible. For the study of how negative performance information elicits 
attributions we draw on a long tradition in social psychology of studying causal triggers 
(Roese 1997, Wiener 1985). Social psychology posits that negative feedback is fundamental 
to the search for explanations: Why did something go wrong? We use a novel method of 
open-text response to track and code the spontaneous attributions which citizens make after 
being exposed to performance information of varied valence. 
We find consistent and strong evidence of a negativity bias in citizens’ 
responses to various performance information. The asymmetry is striking: Citizens responses 
to positive performance information is very similar to their responses to neutral information - 
only if performance information is negative do we observe strong and robust differences. The 
pattern is found across two nationally-representative surveys as we have also conducted an 
independent replication. Furthermore, we find that the negativity bias extends far beyond an 
immediate asymmetry in citizens evaluations. Most strikingly, we find that citizens 
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spontaneously produce causal attributions if exposed to negative valence performance 
information. In short, they are far more likely to generate explanations of why organizations 
obtain negative results than if results are positive. The findings have a number of implications 
for future research: First, the findings indicate that the negativity bias is a basic human 
feature which is likely to play a role for perceptions and decision-making institutional 
features which amplify negative information (Hood 2007; 2010, 13). Second, it lends 
credibility to recent studies on blame avoidance among managers and politicians: a strong 
negativity bias increases the stakes at hand for avoiding negative performances. It also raises 
important questions about politicians’ strategies to avoid blame (Hood and Dixon 2010). 
Third, the findings forces us to investigate if the negativity bias is in fact a “bias” in a 
normative sense – maybe citizens are better off by narrowly focusing on negative feedback? 
These implications are outlined further in the final section. 
 
The Negativity Bias and Public Performance Information 
The negativity bias posits that negative events have a greater impact on the individual than 
positive events of the same magnitude. Psychology finds consistent support for a negativity 
bias in human perception, emotional response, decision making, behavior, and memory 
(Baumeister et al. 2001; Rozin and Royzman 2001). Evolutionary explanations emphasize the 
potential adaptive value of responding in an asymmetrical fashion to negative events. 
Throughout human history negative events have been more extreme, irreversible, contagious, 
and potentially life-threatening (Hibbing, Smith, and Alford 2014). A negativity bias could 
therefore be seen as ecologically rational because, with the limits of bounded rationality in 
mind (Simon 1955), responding more strongly to negative inputs is a rule of thumb that 
serves us well in most instances.  
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In public administration the negativity bias has largely been seen as problematic 
and unproductive because it skews citizens’ evaluation of performance information which, in 
turn, affects how credit and blame is assigned to politicians and managers (Boyne et al. 2007; 
Hood 2007; 2010). The idea of a negativity bias in citizens’ evaluations is at odds with a 
symmetrical view of the impact caused by performance information. Clearly, if the negativity 
bias is important for the effect of performance information, then citizens’ attention, attitudes, 
and decision-making will mainly be affected by negative performance information, which can 
have important downstream effects on politicians and managers behavior. However, while 
psychology provides a strong empirical and theoretical foundation for the bias, we cannot 
directly draw implications from these findings to the field of public administration and, more 
specifically, the study of performance information. For instance, in psychology most studies 
of negativity bias focus on how the individual weighs negative and positive events which 
they personally experience or which they observe occurring for other individuals (Fiske 
1980). For the case of performance information, we primarily study how citizens draw 
inferences from information about “abstract” entities such as organizations, governments, or 
countries. Studies of the negativity bias are therefore merited in a political-administrative 
context. 
If we take a closer look on studies of the negativity bias in public administration 
we find a number of both observational and experimental studies with mixed findings. Some 
of these issues stem from the fact that, in most of these studies, the evidence for or against a 
negativety bias is often indirect and not the primary target of the study. James and John 
(2007) relies on data from the Comprehensive Performance Assessments (CPA) of local 
authorities in England. By connecting local CPA scores with the vote share of the incumbent 
they find a “clear negativity bias, with the category of poor performance resulting in 
punishment but excellent performance not being equally rewarded” (James and John 2007, 
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577). Along the same lines, Boyne et al. (2009, 1282) also analyze CPA scores, incumbent 
votes, and citizen satisfaction surveys and conclude that “Negativity bias exists. Only the 
difference between low performance and anything better matters”. James (2011a) combines 
observational and experimental evidence to test differences in how expectations form 
citizens’ evaluations of performance information, concluding that “negativity bias is evident 
with information about poor performance having a larger effect”. One potential criticism of 
these studies is that the negative and positive information being compared is in fact 
qualitatively different - for instance if citizens do not understand “poor” and “excellent” 
performance as equivalent labels with opposing valence. Psychologists have long struggled 
with separating magnitude or “extremity” of information from its valence as negative 
information is often more extreme, unexpected, and infrequently observed (Rozin and 
Royzman 2001). A related issue is to define the boundaries we draw between negative and 
positive information. Often citizens use their expectations as a reference point as to why they 
“often take good government for granted and pay more attention to insufficient performance” 
(Yang and Holzer 2006, 116). The observational studies also highlight these weak points and 
note how “negativity bias in political behavior would also seem to merit further research at 
the individual level” (John and James 2007, 578). 
While the observational studies generally find a negativity bias, the 
experimental evidence is more mixed. James (2011b) experimentally assigned positive and 
negative information in both a lab and a field setting and “did not find clear evidence of 
negativity bias”, although the study notes that the null finding may be explained by a 
divergence between the experimental treatments and the actual performance of the units 
citizens were evaluating. James and Moseley (2014) set out to compare absolute and relative 
performances, which also indirectly allows them to evaluate difference in how positive and 
negative information affect citizens. They find some support for a negativity bias insofar as 
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absolute bad performance decreases citizens’ satisfaction while good performance has no 
effect. However, for relative performance the findings are inconclusive and they note how 
“more research on negativity bias within a single integrated experiment would help confirm 
these results…” (James and Moseley 2015, 13). Finally, Olsen (2015) relies on an 
equivalence framing experiment to study how citizens evaluate public hospitals given 
information about either a certain level of “satisfaction” vs. a level of “dissatisfaction”. The 
study finds that citizens respond much more negatively to a “10% dissatisfaction rate” than a 
logically equivalent “90% satisfaction rate”. However, showing that citizens respond 
differently does necessarily imply a negativity bias, but might as well be due to a positivity 
bias. We need a neutral point for comparison in order to find out if the “negative” or the 
“positive” information is causing the asymmetry. We cannot determine which of the two is 
driving the difference without a benchmark to compare the relative effect of positive and 
negative. 
Here we will adopt a modified equivalence framing setup to solve the criticisms 
and mixed findings of the existing studies. Equivalence frames are defined as “objectively 
equivalent descriptions of the same problem” (Levin, Schneider, and Gaeth 1998, 150). For 
instance, many performance indicators can be labeled with either a positive or negative 
valence label: death rates/survival rates, satisfaction/dissatisfaction, pass/fail, 
employment/unemployment etc. While holding constant the numerical level of performance 
we can switch labels to change the information’s valence.  For instance, we can present some 
citizens with a “10% fail rate” for a public school while others are exposed to a “90% pass 
rate”. Logically, the two pieces of information are equivalent, yet their difference in valence 
is likely to provide very different evaluations of the school to those exposed to the 
information. The underlying theoretical mechanism rests on individual encoding of 
information given its descriptive valence (March and Simon 1958; Levin and Gaeth 1988; 
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Quattrone and Tversky 1988). Encoding affects the associative memory by increasing the 
accessibility of valence-consistent information, i.e., positive valence performance information 
elicits positive associations while negative valence performance information elicits negative 
associations. For instance, when we told about a fail we are immediately reminded about 
everything that can be wrong with a public school, such as lazy students, incompetent 
teachers, corrupt management, or rundown facilities due to a lack of funds. Positive and 
negative associations cause a “valence-consistent shift” in an individual’s evaluation (Levin, 
Schneider, and Gaeth 1998). Accordingly, even when the underlying performance is 
identical, the valence of the information will affect evaluations: Negative-valence 
information obtains a more negative evaluation than positive information with the same 
substantive information, e.g. a “10% fail rate” for a public school vs. a “90% pass rate”. The 
equivalence framing perspective provides solutions for the problems identified in the existing 
studies. First, by presenting citizens with logically-equivalent numerical information and only 
switching the valence of the information’s label we overcome concerns about the positive and 
negative information being qualitatively different on other dimensions. Second, we propose a 
modified equivalence frame where we compare the effect of negative and positive 
information relative to a neutral midpoint where citizens are informed by both the negative 
and the positive information. This allows us to identify if the negative frame is, in fact, 
causing the asymmetry. Finally, the equivalence framework provides a hard and conservative 
theoretical underpinning for testing the negativity bias. Theoretically, it requires that we 
identify an asymmetry between positive and negative performance information even when 
the underlying information is identical. It implies that if we find evidence in favor of a 
negativity bias within this framework, it will lend strong credibility to the strength and 
relevance of the asymmetrical effect of negative information on citizens’ evaluations. From 
this basis we can now formulate our first main hypothesis:  
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Negativity bias in evaluations: Negative valence performance information will 
have a greater impact on citizens’ evaluations of a public service than positive valence 
performance information of the same magnitude relative to neutral performance information. 
 
Beyond Evaluations: Negative Information Elicits Responsibility Attributions 
The asymmetrical effect of positive and negative information reaches well beyond the 
dimension of evaluation and judgment. Reviews of the negativity bias stress how negative 
input dominates or exerts widely different responses than positive information on a wide 
range of dimensions. These include perception, attention, physiological arousal, memory, 
impression formation and generally, responses to negative stimuli, are often more 
differentiated and elaborate than to positive ones (Baumeister et al. 2001, Rosin and 
Rozyman 2001). From a political-administrative perspective the most important one of these 
is the difference in how negative and positive feedback prompts an attributional process 
(Kelly 1973; Wiener 1984; Roese 1997). Greater information processing is likely to produce 
more elaborate, thorough, and extensive cognitive interpretations, which includes attributions 
about the information (Baumeister et al. 2001, 340). In other words, negative input elicits 
more attributional activity (Rozin and Royzman 2001: 301): We think about why something 
went wrong, not why it went well. This basic idea is far from new to public administration. 
At an organizational level there has long been a focus on how negative feedback plays a 
distinct role beyond evaluations. We broadly encounter the view that performance is coded as 
either a loss or gain, success or failure, negative or positive, and good or bad - this, in turn, 
affects how managers and organizations respond (March and Simon 1958; Meier et al. 2015). 
Attributions about performance are initiated as soon as dissatisfaction and failure is observed. 
It becomes a “stimulus to search for lessons” (Rose 1991), a trigger for “problemistic 
search”, or initiates “trial-and-error experimentation” (Cyert & March 1963, Salge 2010). 
10 
 
Returning to social and cognitive psychology, we find multiple strands of research which also 
applies a similar logic at the citizens’ level. “Spontaneous” attributional activity is defined by 
Wiener (1985) as an individual’s attempt to explain realized outcomes by identifying the 
cause for them. Individuals try to understand events they are exposed to, and this process is 
largely an attributional one. For the purpose of our study, we can view performance 
information about an organization as an outcome to which the individual can generate 
attributions. Wiener’s review of a large number of existing studies shows that negative events 
elicit much more spontaneous attributional activity than positive events. For instance, 
Gilovich (1983), involved participants in an experimental bet on sporting events. 
Subsequently, the participants shared their thoughts about the game, and those who had lost 
spent more time discussing the game than those who won. A related strand of research 
focuses on individuals “counterfactual thinking”, which denotes a mental representation of 
alternatives to the past (Roese 1997). It finds that counterfactual thinking is more likely to be 
triggered by negative events and emotions. Roese (1997, 133) stresses that counterfactual 
thinking does not require deliberate activation but is prompted automatically when we are 
faced with negative input. We here see a clear analogy to the view of negative performance in 
organizational theory as trigger for learning. However, here failure is a seen as a fundamental 
human signal to look for antecedents for the observed outcome. This provides the basis for 
our second main hypothesis: 
Spontaneous attributions from negative performance: Negative performance 
information will elicit spontaneous attributions to a greater degree than positive performance 
information of the same magnitude. 
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Design: Three Experimental Studies in Two Nationally-Representative Samples 
In order to test our two central hypothesis on the nature of the negativity bias we have 
conducted three studies embedded in two independent surveys. Study 1 tests the negativity 
bias on the basis of our modified equivalence framework by comparing the effect on citizens 
of positive and negative performance information in relation to neutral information 
containing both positive and negative aspects. Study 2 is a replication of one of the vignette 
experiments in study 1 in order to confirm the magnitude and validity of the negativity bias. 
Study 3 investigates differences in how negative, neutral, and positive performance 
information leads to spontaneous attribution of responsibility, as expected in our second main 
hypothesis. The three studies are reliant on two large and nationally-representative samples of 
Danish citizens. Studies 1 and 3 are reliant upon data from the same survey collected in 
March 2015 (n=1,559) and the replication in study 2 draws upon a survey conducted in May 
2015 (n=1,013). Specific aspects of each survey will outlined independently as each study is 
presented. Both experimental surveys were fielded in YouGov’s Danish online panel.1 Both 
were restricted to citizens between the ages of 18 and 74 and were pre-stratified on gender, 
geographical region, age, and political party choice in order to achieve a near-representative 
sample of the Danish population. Descriptive statistics for both samples are provided in 
appendix table A1. Population representative samples provide strong external validity for the 
findings to the public-at-large. Moreover, the large sample sizes (and relative few 
experimental conditions) mean that we have statistical power to detect even relatively small 
degrees of negativity bias.   
 
 
 
                                                            
1As a payment for participating in the survey, participants received a number of “points,” which can be used for 
purchases in YouGov shop. 
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Study 1: A Test of the Negativity Bias in Performance Information Evaluation 
The purpose of the first experimental study is to estimate a negativity bias with an 
equivalence framing experiment that includes a neutral category. Here the negativity bias 
estimate is equal to the difference between the negative vs. neutral treatment and the positive 
vs. neutral treatment. If the former is significantly larger than the latter, there is evidence of a 
negativity bias.  
 
Participants 
The experiments conducted in study 1 are reliant upon data from the first nationally-
representative sample (n=1,559), which took around five minutes to complete and included a 
number of experiments and background questions.2 At the onset of the survey all participants 
were informed about that the study would include a number of hypothetical cases - which 
nonetheless resemble real-life scenarios and cases. 
 
                          
Experimental Design and Procedure 
Study 1 consists of two experimental vignettes focusing on hospital and school performance. 
Both vignettes are between-subject design with four different treatments in each. The 
treatments are outlined in table 1 and 2. Both vignettes are equivalence framing experiments 
where conditions contain logically-equivalent information but differ in the valence of the 
performance information as either positive, neutral, or negative (Levin, Schneider, and Gaeth 
1998; Tversky and Kahneman 1981). Both experiments ask subjects to evaluate an unnamed 
public organization (hospital and school) after having been given some simple piece of 
performance information. In the hospital case negative and positive treatment is defined by 
presenting logically-equivalent levels of patient (dis)satisfaction as either a satisfied or 
                                                            
2The full survey contained 3,145 observations of which, on a subset of 1,559, were assigned to the experiments 
reported on here. The complete survey was assigned to a sample of 15,535 which yields a response rate of 
20.2%.  
13 
 
dissatisfied percentage (cf. table 1). In the school case positive and negative treatment is 
defined by presenting logically-equivalent information on students’ exam results as being 
either the pass rate or the fail rate. The numerical content allows us to hold informational 
content equally across treatments while varying the informational valence between 
descriptive labels with negative valence (“dissatisfaction” and “fail rate”) and positive 
valence (“satisfaction” and “pass rate”).3 The treatment conditions, as viewed by the subjects 
in the survey, are shown in appendix figures 1A and 2A. 
 
Table 1: Hospital Performance Information Experiment 
Baseline question (all participants): 
 
Imagine that a hospital has achieved the following results: 
 
Treatment frames (randomly assigned): 
Positive (n=519) Neutral I (n=257) Neutral II (n=264) Negative (n=529) 
 
78% of the patients 
are satisfied with their 
treatment. 
 
78% of the patients 
are satisfied with their 
treatment. 
 
22% of the patients 
are dissatisfied with 
their treatment. 
 
 
22% of the patients 
are dissatisfied with 
their treatment. 
 
78% of the patients 
are satisfied with 
their treatment. 
 
22% of the patients 
are dissatisfied with 
their treatment. 
 
How well do you think the hospital is doing given the above? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
3The specific percentages and rates are chosen as they are fairly realistic in terms of what could be experienced 
in the real world. 
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Table 2: School Performance Information Experiment 
Baseline question (all participants): 
 
Imagine that a public school has achieved the following results: 
Treatment frames (randomly assigned): 
Positive (n=519) Neutral I (n=257) Neutral II (n=264) Negative (n=530) 
 
85% of students have 
passed their exams.  
 
85% of students have 
passed their exams.  
 
15% of students have 
failed their exams 
 
 
15% of students have 
failed their exams. 
 
85% of students have 
passed their exams.  
 
 
15% of students have 
failed their exams. 
 
 
How well do you think the school is doing given the above? 
 
In the neutral treatments, subjects are provided with “both sides of the coin”, namely both the 
satisfied/dissatisfied percentage and the pass/fail rate. By introducing a neutral treatment we 
can now capture the negativity bias by comparing the difference-in-difference between 
positive-neutral treatments and neutral-negative treatments. In both vignettes the neutral 
category is split into two separate treatments: one in which the positive valence information is 
presented first and one in which the negative valence information is presented first. This is 
conducted in order to make the neutral treatment robust to order effects in the presentation of 
information (Hogarth and Einhorn, 1992).4 The response scale was a 101-point scale from 0 
to 100 ranging from “very poor” (0) to “very good” (100) for both experiments.5 In the 
hospital case the average evaluation across all treatments was 45.3 (SD=25.1), and in the 
school experiment 48.6 (SD=26.8).6 In order to confirm that the randomization of subjects to 
treatment conditions achieved we conducted a set of successful balance tests on the subjects’ 
background characteristics, as reported in appendix table A2.  
                                                            
4We could both suspect that primacy or recency effects could affect subjects and thereby pollute the neutrality of 
the information. In the analysis, the neutral treatments will be treated as one combined neutral treatment which 
levels out any order effects by pooling the two neutral treatments. 
5Subjects were not respond “don’t know” but had to provide an evaluation of the organization. 
6The median response time in the hospital case was 15.6 seconds and 15.1 seconds in the school experiment. 
15 
 
Empirical Findings in Study 1 
First we turn to the hospital experiment as shown in figure 1.7 This reveals major differences 
in average evaluation and the overall distribution of responses across the three treatment 
conditions. In the negative performance information treatment, the average evaluation is 32.4 
(SD=21.1) which is substantially and significantly lower than both the neutral condition of 
49.8 (SD=25.3, p<0.001)8 and the positive treatment of 56.9 (SD=22.2, p<0.001). 
Furthermore, the positive condition is significantly larger than the neutral condition (p<0.01). 
These differences are also mirrored in the distributions, with median values of 26 (negative), 
52 (neutral), and 60 (positive). The difference of 24.5 points between the positive and 
negative condition is whole standard deviation: Providing citizens with substantively 
identical information but with different valence causes dramatic shifts in their evaluations. 
More importantly, a substantive part of this effect is driven by a negativity bias. The 
negativity bias is captured as the difference-in-difference between the negative/neutral 
condition comparison and the positive/neutral treatment. The results show that the neutral 
condition was much closer to the positive treatment than the negative one - which is 
consistent with the negativity bias. Evaluation for the positive frame is 7.1 points higher than 
the neutral frame while the evaluation for the negative condition is 17.4 points lower than the 
neutral condition. The valance asymmetry is very clear: If we compare this difference-in-
difference directly we find a substantial and significant negativity bias as the negative frame 
is 10.3 points further away from the neutral condition than the distance between the neutral 
and the positive (p<0.001). Taken together, we find convincing evidence of a negativity bias 
for the hospital experiment in support of our first hypothesis. 
                                                            
7All p-values are computed with t-tests for means or proportions unless some other test is explicitly noted in the 
text. 
8As noted in the methods section, we have polled the two neutral conditions which rated the positive and 
negative information. The first neutral condition had average of 51.7 points (SD=25.0) and the second natural 
condition was evaluated at 48.0 points (SD=25.5). This indicates that listing the positive valence information 
before the negative valence information induced slightly higher evaluations. However, overall the difference 
between the neutral conditions is very small and insignificant (p=0.10). 
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Figure 1: Effect of Randomized Performance Information from a Hospital on Citizens’  
Evaluation of Public Service Performance (N=1559). Note: The left panel shows the mean 
evaluations across the three experimental conditions with 95% confidence intervals. The 
right panel illustrates the distribution of evaluations across the three conditions with the 
median evaluation in black. 
 
          
 
Following this, we can compare the effects in the school experiment in figure 2. Here the 
difference appears even larger than in the school case, with the negative condition of a 15% 
fail rate dramatically different from the two others. The negative performance information 
treatment with an average of 35.5 (SD=23.0) is substantially and significantly lower than 
both the neutral treatment of 53.3 (SD=26.6, p<0.001)9 and the positive treatment of 57.3 
(SD=25.6, p<0.001). Evaluations for the positive treatment are significantly higher than the 
neutral  (p<0.05). These differences are also reflected in the median values: 30 (negative), 56 
(neutral), and 62 (positive). Again we capture the negativity bias as the difference-in-
difference between the negative/neutral condition comparison and the positive/neutral 
comparison. 
                                                            
9As in the hospital experiment the two neutral conditions are combined. The first neutral condition had average 
of 54.6 points (SD=26.5) and the second natural condition was evaluated at 52.0 points (SD=26.7). Again a 
slightly higher evaluation for the neutral condition that presents positive valence information first, but, as in the 
hospital experiment, the difference is not significant (p=0.25).  
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Figure 2: Effect of Randomized Performance Information Valence from a School on 
Citizens Evaluation of Public Service Performance (N=1,559). Note: The left panel shows 
the mean evaluations across the three experimental conditions with 95% confidence 
intervals. The right panel illustrates the distribution of evaluations across the three 
conditions with the median evaluation in black. 
 
          
Just from comparing the relative distances between the three conditions we can sense that the 
negativity bias is even stronger in the school experiment. The difference between the negative 
and neutral condition was 17.8 points while the difference between the positive and neutral 
was just 4.0 points. The difference-in-difference is therefore large and significant at 13.8 
points (p<0.001): how much further away the negative condition is from the neutral. Again 
very robust evidence of an asymmetry in citizens’ evaluations which conforms to a very 
strong and pervasive negativity bias. Taken together, findings across both experiments are 
consistent with the expectation of valence-consistent shifts in citizens’ evaluations as the 
valence of the performance labels changes, while the underlying information is held constant. 
Most importantly, we find that convincing evidence of a negativity bias: there is a persistent 
asymmetry in the evaluations of positive and negative frames in relation to the neutral one. 
Evaluations of the negative frame a much further below evaluations for the neutral frame than 
evaluations of the positive frame are above the neutral frame.  
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Study 2: Replication of Study 1 
Study 1 provided surprisingly strong evidence of a negativity bias in citizens’ evaluation of 
public services from performance information. In light of the more mixed findings on a 
negativity bias in the existing literature on performance information, we conducted a direct 
replication study in order to confirm the magnitude of the findings in study 1. We only 
replicated the school experiment as it showed the largest effect in study 1. 
 
Participants 
As in study 1, the replication relies on a large nationally-representative sample of the Danish 
population (n=1,013). The data was collected between May 21st and the 26th in 2015. A total 
of 3,502 subjects were invited to participate in the survey yielding a response rate of 28.9% 
for full completes.10 The survey contained multiple unrelated experiments with the replication 
study placed at the very end of the questionnaire. The median response time for the full 
survey was around 5 minutes. 
 
Experimental Design and Procedure 
Study 2 is an exact replication of the school experiment in study 1 and relied on the exact 
same treatment conditions for the school experiment as shown earlier in table 2.11 As the 
sample was slightly smaller the number of subjects across the four conditions was: n=406 
(negative), n=204 (neutral I and II), and n=403 (negative). The response scale was also 
exactly the same and the mean response across all conditions was 47.8 (SD=25.1). 
 
 
                                                            
10 Participating subjects received 25 points eligibale for purchases or lotteries at YouGov. 
11 The presentation of the conditions was also the exact and is shown in appendix B. 
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Empirical Findings in Study 2  
Results from the replicated school experiment are shown in figure 3. The overall pattern 
closely resembles the findings in study 1. The negative condition generates by far the lowest 
evaluation at 37.8 points (SD=23.7) which is significantly lower than the 50.8 points 
(SD=24.7) for the neutral frame (p<0.001)12 and the 56.2 points (SD=23.1) for the positive 
frame (p<0.001). Evaluations for the neutral frame are also significantly lower than for the 
positive frame (p<0.01). Median evaluations are 37.5 points for the negative, 51.0 points for 
the neutral, and 59.0 the positive. Again, we therefore find a strong negativity bias, with the 
difference between the negative and neutral condition amounting to 13 points - while the 
positive condition is just 5.4 points below the neutral condition. This provides a difference-
in-difference between conditions of 7.6 points (p<0.05) which indicates a credible negativity 
bias. Taken together, study 2 replicates the findings of study 1.  
Figure 3: Effect of Randomized Performance Information Valence about a School on 
Citizens Evaluations (n=1,013). Note: The left panel shows the mean evaluations across the 
three experimental conditions with 95% confidence intervals. The right panel illustrates the 
distribution of evaluations across the three conditions with the median evaluation in black. 
 
          
                                                            
12As in the original study there is no substantive or significant difference between the two polled natural 
conditions (p=0.36). 
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Study 3: Performance Valence and Attribution of Responsibility 
In study 3 we proceed to test differences in spontaneous attributions of responsibility if 
exposed to negative, neutral, and positive performance information. As argued in our second 
hypothesis, we expect that negative performance information to induce spontaneous 
attributions about responsibility among citizens (Weiner 1985; Roese 1997).  
 
Participants 
The participants are the same as those who participated in study 1 (n=1,559). 
 
Experimental Design and Procedure 
We were reliant on a question that immediately followed the treatment conditions in Study 1. 
Here the subjects were confronted with open-ended questions and a text box on a separate 
page. Subjects were asked to elaborate on their thoughts about the hospital and school which 
they just evaluated. Specifically, subjects were asked to: “Write a comment on what you 
immediately think about the hospital given the provided information:” Following the school 
experiment the subjects were asked the exact same question with regards to the school.13 We 
relied on open-ended responses because we wanted to capture spontaneous attributions of 
responsibility. In closed-ended questions the response scale would provide strong cues to 
subjects about the intent of the survey (RePass 1971; Geer 1991). This would have been 
problematic as we did not want to create demand effects among subjects which provided 
hints as to attribution of responsibility. For instance, it is important but at the same time 
difficult to avoid words like “blame” or “credit” when measuring responsibility attributions 
(Rudolf 2003). Opting for open-responses reduces demand effects and allows us to study the 
extent to which attributions arise spontaneously. In order to analyze the responses we relied 
                                                            
13The screen, as viewed by each subject, is provided in appendix figure A3. Subjects had to fill in at least one 
character in order to proceed in the survey. If they attempted to proceed without providing a response then they 
were informed about this response rule in a brief notification on the screen. 
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in on manual coding of the responses. The coder had no prior knowledge of the experiments 
and was only informed that the text comments were responses from citizens after exposure to 
performance information. In the coding process the coder was blinded to the treatment 
conditions and was presented with the open-text responses in random order. The primary 
variable to be coded is an indicator of attribution of responsibility. Specifically, the coding 
manual instructed the coder to answer the following question for each entry into the open text 
box: “Does the text provide one or more considerations about possible explanations or 
reasons for the school’s/hospital’s accomplished result?” This provided us with a dummy 
variable indicating text responses with spontaneous attributions. We here relied on the 
standard coding in psychological research on attributions in written material, defined as, “a 
phrase or sentence in which some performance outcome…was linked with a reason for that 
outcome” (Bettman and Weitz 1983, 173).14 Descriptive statistics of the text responses and 
coding is reported in table 3. Subjects spent around 30 seconds providing their text response 
and produced an average of about 12 words for each experiment. Most importantly, about 
40% of the subjects’ responses were coded as containing attributional content. In the 
following analysis, our main goal is to understand variation in the attributional activity across 
the three experimental groups. Following this, we will also provide some examples of the 
attributions made by subjects. Non-attribution content (“other responses”) usually took the 
form of elaborating on the closed responses which subjects provided in study 1. Finally, the 
valence of attributions was also coded as either negative, neutral, or positive. Given our 
hypothesis we are mostly interested in negative valence attributions which are likely to 
contain blame content. On average between 60% and 70% of the attributions in the two 
experiments were of negative valence. 
 
                                                            
14This definition is fairly typical throughout existing studies on spontaneous attributions (Weiner 1985, 76). 
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics, Coding, and Reliability in Study 3 
 Hospital 
experiment 
School 
experiment 
Descriptives:   
Mean number of words in responses 11.9 12.1 
Median response latency (seconds) 
 
Attribution coding: 
Percentage of responses with attributions 
32.3 
n=1,559 
 
41.1% 
32.4 
n=1,559 
 
39.3% 
Percentage of other responses 52.6% 55.3% 
Percentage with no response 6.3% 5.4% 
Total 
 
100% 
n=1,559 
100% 
n=1,559 
Reliability of attribution coding:   
Percent of inter-coder agreement 91.7% 82.8% 
Cohen’s Kappa 0.82 
n=157 
0.63 
n=157 
   
Coding of attribution valence:   
Percentage of attributions with negative valence  60.3% 70.1% 
 n=635 n=604 
 
Another independent coder coded a random sample of 10% of the observations (n=157) for 
both the hospital and school experiments in order to test for an inter-coder reliability test. In 
both experiments the level of mutual agreement is above 80%. Cohen's Kappa captures inter-
coder agreement for qualitative items and accounts for agreement attributable to chance 
(Blackman and Koval 2000). We find high to very high Kappa values for the coding of 
attributions in both experiments.15  
 
Empirical Findings in Study 3 
The main findings from the hospital experiment are presented in figure 4 as the percentage of 
open-ended responses containing attributions of responsibility across the three conditions. 
We find the highest degree of attribution in the negative condition at 44.8% which is not 
significantly higher than the 42.6% for the neutral condition (p=0.39), but substantively and 
                                                            
15Kappa values of 0.6 or higher are regarded as a substantial level of mutual agreement (Landis and Koch 1977). 
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significantly higher than the just 35.9% of subjects engaging in attribution of responsibility in 
the positive condition (p<0.01).16 The difference between the positive and negative condition 
of around 9 percentage points amounts to a difference in attributions of about 25% which 
suggests that negative performance is indeed a trigger for spontaneous attribution of 
responsibility relative to positive performance. Moreover, the right panel shows that 74% of 
attributions under the negative treatment condition are of negative valence, which is 
significantly more than for 52.8% in the neutral condition (p<0.001) and 51.1% in the 
positive condition (p<0.001).17  
 
Figure 4: Effect of Randomized Performance Information about a Hospital on Citizens 
Attribution of Responsibility. Note: The left panel shows the percentage of open-ended text 
responses containing attributions about performance across the three experimental 
conditions (with 95% CIs). The right panel shows the percentage of negative valence 
attributions of the total number of attributions across the three experimental conditions (with 
95% CIs). 
 
         
 
                                                            
16The degree of responsibility attribution also significantly lower in the positive condition than in the neutral 
condition (p<0.05). 
17The percentage of negative valence attribution is not significantly different from each other in the neutral and 
positive conditions (p=0.74). 
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If we take an exploratory look at some examples of attributions made be the subject, we find 
that most of them are directed at hospital level actors like the management, doctors, or nurses. 
One example states how “bad doctors, and nurses that care more about coffee meetings than 
doing their job.” Some subjects provide quite detailed attributions: “If 1 out of 5 patients are 
unsatisfied, one needs to determine what they are complaining about. What is the 
commitment of the staff? Where is the management in this particular case?” Others are less 
subtle in their attributions of responsibility: “there has to be a bad management at that 
hospital.” 
Findings from the school experiment are presented in figure 5. Again, the 
negative information condition produces the greatest degree of responsibility attribution by 
far, with 48.2% of responses. It is significantly higher than for both the neutral condition 
(36.6%, p<0.001) and the positive condition (32.3%, p<0.001). The neutral and positive 
conditions are not significantly different from each other (p=0.15). The difference between 
the positive and negative conditions of about 16% reveals a difference in spontaneous 
attributions of about 49%. Again we see in the right panel that attributions are predominantly 
negative - in particular under the negative condition. In the negative condition 79.4% of the 
attributions are negative, which is significantly higher than for the 66.8% for the neutral 
condition (p<0.01) and the 60.4% (p<0.001).18 In the school experiment we also see that most 
attributions are directed towards the school level. Many of them are directed at the teachers: 
“the commitment among the personnel might be too small.” Others in this category point to 
failure of the management, i.e. “poorly managed school.” Unlike the hospital experiment, we 
find examples of attributions directed towards the users of the service such as students and 
parents: “The parents refrain from taking responsibility. It is much easier just to blame the 
school system, but there will always be some that cannot make it.” 
                                                            
18
 The percentage of negative valence attribution is not significantly different from each other in the neutral and 
positive conditions (p=0.21). 
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Figure 5: Effect of Randomized Performance Information about a School on Citizens’ 
Attribution of Responsibility. Note: The left panel illustrates the percentage of open-ended 
text responses containing attributions about performance across the three experimental 
conditions (with 95% CIs). The right panel shows the percentage of negative valence 
attributions of the total number of attributions across the three experimental conditions (with 
95% CIs). 
 
       
   
Conclusions and Implications 
This article grew out of the recent interest in how the negativity bias affects how citizens 
draws inferences from performance information. We found that the negativity bias has a 
strong and multifaceted impact on what inferences citizens draw from performance 
information regarding public services. First, we found a very robust experimental negativity 
bias in citizens’ evaluations of negative, neutral, and positive performance information. 
Negative performance information induced very negative evaluations of two very different 
public services, while neutral and positive performance information led to a considerably 
larger amount of similar evaluations. The asymmetrical effects were large and the 
equivalence framing experiment provided a conservative test which, together with the 
independent replication, gave strong support for the negativity bias. Second, we provided the 
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first experimental evidence of spontaneous attribution in citizens’ response to negative 
performances. After being exposed to negative valence performance information citizens 
were much more likely to spontaneously produce causal attributions about performance. 
Furthermore, the attributions made following negative performance information were much 
more likely to contain negative content in the form of “blame” for the outcome. 
It is important to stress the limits of the studies and findings presented here. 
While the external validity across subjects is strengthened by the use of two nationally-
representative samples, we should always be cautious when extending results from vignette 
experiments embedded in a survey to the messy reality of how citizens are exposed to 
performance information in the real world. A key focus for follow-up studies should be to test 
the external validity of the negativity bias in real-world administrative settings.  
The findings have a number of implications for both public managers and future 
research. First, they provide a robust piece in the complex puzzle of understanding the 
inferences that citizens draw from performance information. Identifying the negativity bias is 
interesting it its own right because it corrects our view of how citizens respond to 
performance information. The average citizen’s response to performance information is 
largely driven by the excessive weight given to negative information which not only affects 
evaluations but also attributions about performance. Some have speculated if the negativity 
bias is a “constant in human affairs” or if it only emerges in public administration due to 
certain institutional features which amplify negative information (Hood 2007; 2010, 13). Our 
experiments point to the fact that the bias is a very fundamental feature of human information 
processing which naturally affects how performance information is perceived. This raises the 
question of how the negativity bias works if it is in conflict with other fundamental 
determinants of how citizens process performance information. For instance, a natural 
extension would be to integrate the negativity bias with recent findings on how motivated 
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reasoning and implicit attitudes guide the inferences which citizens draw from performance 
data (Marvel 2014; Bækgaard and Serritzlew 2015). This would allow us to study how 
citizens deal with negative performance information if they also are motivated by pre-existing 
attitudes to have a favorable view of the organization. 
Secondly, the findings offer credibility to theories on blame avoidance which 
posits the negativity bias among citizens as being the underlying mechanism as to why 
politicians pursue a minimax strategy (Weaver 1986, Dixon and Hood 2010, Moynihan 
2012). Moreover, the fact that negativity not only drives evaluations of performance 
information but also triggers attributions about responsibility draws an even more powerful 
link between the negativity bias and blame avoidance as a downstream effect. Managers and 
politicians have at least two reasons to be concerned with negative performance information: 
(a) It has a stronger effect on evaluations in negative direction and (b) it is more likely to 
elicit attributions which negatively link poor performance with those responsible. At the same 
time, the results call for greater inquiry into how politicians and managers avoid blame – in 
particular how performance information can be turned to from a mechanism for appointing 
blame into one of blame avoidance. As Hood (2010, 48) forcefully argues: “victims of 
negativity bias” will go to great lengths to “correct such bias to keep blame at bay”. Here the 
findings direct our attention to how the effect of negative performance information may be 
mitigated with “presentational strategies” (Hood 2010, 17) or attempts to “redefine the issue” 
(Weaver 1986, 386). The equivalence framing experiment illustrates how, with subtle 
changes in labeling, the very same pieces of performance information can cause major shifts 
in citizens’ evaluations and attributions. It calls upon us to look closer at observational data of 
how organizations present information with an aim of shaping the public’s perception of 
performance .  
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 Finally, we need more fundamental research regarding what kind of “bias” a 
negativity bias would be (Soroka 2006; 2014). The “bias” in negativity bias can be 
understood in at least two ways: First, in a minimal sense we can understand bias as a 
systematic divergence from a model of the world which we rely on. In this sense, the notion 
of a bias helps correct the false (layman’s) impression that positive and negative information 
is given symmetrical or equal weight. A second interpretation of “bias” would make a value-
laden statement. It would emphasize that an over-reliance on negative input leads to a less 
“optimal” judgment compared with some normative models of rational decision-making 
which tell us to put equal weight to positive and negative information of the same magnitude. 
The findings support the first interpretation, but the second interpretation would require direct 
comparisons with alternative ways that citizens could understand  performance data. In public 
administration we often implicitly draw on the latter interpretation which leads to a concern 
about how to make citizens value “good” performance. We believe that correcting the 
negativity bias could help turn organizations’ focus away from avoiding failure and towards 
the pursuit of excellence.  This may very well be true, but from a model of bounded 
rationality, we must also keep the possibility open that the negativity bias could be a rule of 
thumb that, in most instances, serves citizens well. In short, it might place an over-reliance on 
failure detection, but in the aggregate provides citizens with a fast and frugal decision-rule for 
making inferences about public sector performance. Moreover, our finding of increased 
attributional activity for negative information offers a parallel to those who stress the 
functional basis of counterfactual thinking in psychology (Roese 1997). It implies that 
citizens think more about causes and effects in the realm of public sector performance, which 
we mostly would recognize as a good and productive thing. To summarize, the negativity 
bias is real and exerts a strong influence on how citizens draw on performance information. 
We have yet to find out if this a good or a bad thing.  
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APPENDIX 
 
                                 Table A1: Socio-demographic Characteristics of Study Participants 
 
Variable 
 
Study 1 & 3 
(n=1,559) 
Study 2 (replication) 
(n=1,013) 
Males (%) 48.6 50 
Age (years) 47.7 46.6 
Geographic region (%)   
Capital area 33.4 32.0 
Zealand 16.1 13.8 
Southern Denmark 24.2 21.5 
Middle Jutland 15.6 22.2 
Northern Jutland 10.8 10.5 
Education (%)   
      High school or lower   21.4 21.2 
      Short-cycle tertiary 19.3 19.0 
      Vocational training 12.6 11.5 
      BA or equivalent 31.0 30.9 
      MA or higher degree 15.7 17.4 
Gov. party supporter (%) 36.1 33.4 
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Figure A1: The Hospital Experiment - The Treatment Conditions as Viewed by the Subjects in Study 1. 
 
Positive condition: “Imagine that a hospital has achieved the 
following results: 78% of the patients are satisfied with their 
treatment. How well do you think the hospital is doing given the 
above?” 
 
Negative condition: “Imagine that a hospital has achieved the 
following results: 22% of the patients are dissatisfied with their 
treatment. How well do you think the hospital is doing given the 
above?” 
 
 
 
Neutral condition I: “Imagine that a hospital has achieved the 
following results: 78% of the patients are satisfied with their 
treatment. 22% of the patients are dissatisfied with their treatment. 
How well do you think the hospital is doing given the above?” 
 
 
Neutral condition II: “Imagine that a hospital has achieved the 
following results: 22% of the patients are dissatisfied with their 
treatment.78% of the patients are satisfied with their treatment. How 
well do you think the hospital is doing given the above?” 
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Figure A2: School Experiment: The Treatment Conditions as Viewed by the Subjects in Study 1 and 2 (replication) 
 
Positive condition: “Imagine that a public school has achieved the 
following results: 85% of students have passed their exams. How well 
do you think the school is doing given the above?” 
 
 
Negative condition: “Imagine that a public school has achieved the 
following results: 15% of students have failed their exams. How well do 
you think the school is doing given the above?” 
 
 
Neutral condition I: “Imagine that a public school has achieved the 
following results: 85% of students have passed their exams. 15% of 
students have failed their exams. How well do you think the school is 
doing given the above?” 
 
 
 
Neutral condition II: “Imagine that a public school has achieved the 
following results: 15% of students have failed their exams. 85% of 
students have passed their exams. How well do you think the school is 
doing given the above?” 
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                   Table A2: Test of Randomization of Treatment Conditions in Study 1 and 3 (n=1,559) 
 
Variable Negative Neutral I & II Positive F Prob. > F 
Males (%) 47.4 47.8 50.5 0.58 0.56 
Age (years) 47.0 48.2 48.0 1.02 0.36 
Geographic region (%)      
Capital area 34.6 32.4 33.1 0.26 0.75 
Zealand 16.6 15.9 15.6 0.11 0.90 
Southern Denmark 21.6 26.7 24.3 1.89 0.15 
Middle Jutland 16.1 14.2 16.6 0.61 0.54 
Northern Jutland 11.2 10.7 10.4 0.08 0.93 
Education (%)      
      High school or lower   21.2 20.0 22.9 0.69 0.50 
      Short-cycle tertiary 18.9 19.4 19.7 0.05 0.95 
      Vocational training 12.5 14.0 11.4 0.83 0.44 
      BA or equivalent 29.3 33.0 30.8 0.85 0.43 
      MA or higher degree 18.1 13.6 15.2 2.01 0.12 
Gov. party supporter (%) 36.1 35.7 36.4 0.03 0.97 
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           Table A3: Test of Randomization of Treatment Conditions in Study 2 – replication (n=1,013) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable Negative Neutral I & II Positive F Prob. > F 
Males (%) 46.6 51.0 52.9 1.66 0.19 
Age (years) 47.8 43.0 47.2 7.19 0.0008 
Geographic region (%)      
Capital area 33.7 27.0 32.8 1.53 0.22 
Zealand 13.3 17.6 12.4 1.64 0.20 
Southern Denmark 20.0 22.1 22.8 0.52 0.60 
Middle Jutland 23.9 20.1 21.6 0.64 0.53 
Northern Jutland 9.1 13.2 10.4 1.23 0.29 
Education (%)      
      High school or lower   18.7 27.5 20.6 3.19 0.04 
      Short-cycle tertiary 22.2 14.6 17.9 2.73 0.07 
      Vocational training 11.6 12.7 10.9 0.22 0.80 
      BA or equivalent 29.6 29.4 33.0 0.69 0.50 
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Figure 3A: The Survey Questions as Viewed by the Subjects in Study 3. 
 
 
 
Following the four hospital conditions: “Write a comment on what you immediately think about the hospital given the provided information:” 
 
 
 
 
Following the four school conditions: “Write a comment on what you immediately think about the school given the provided information:” 
 
 
